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Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance:  
New Evidence 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; 
Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005) by showing that increases in institutional 
ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution 
setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, and a regression discontinuity 
design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and 
discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance 
involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and 
likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively the results shed light on the 
effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Corporate income taxes represent a significant expense to shareholders. Yet tax 
avoidance, defined as the reduction of explicit taxes (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), appears 
underexploited by firms (Weisbach 2002) and exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008).1 These empirical patterns point to variation in benefits and 
costs and lead Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) to call for further research into the determinants 
of tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) renew this call and, in particular, suggest the 
promise of a younger strand of the literature that explores the role of agency frictions in 
explaining variation in tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 
2005). Pursuing this perspective, recent papers have examined the role of ownership structure in 
the form of family ownership of public firms, dual-class shares, hedge fund ownership, and 
private equity backing of private firms (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010; Cheng, Huang, 
Li, and Stanfield 2012; Badertscher, Katz, and Rego 2013; McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 2014). 
In this paper we examine the role of quasi-indexer institutional investors (Bushee 1998, 2001) in 
explaining variation in tax avoidance. 
Shareholders are expected to weigh the benefits of tax avoidance against the costs of 
potential enforcement, penalty, and reputation loss to the firm if the strategy is flagged by tax 
authorities (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Firms’ managers have significant individual effects on 
tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010), and are expected to weigh the private 
benefits from higher firm returns against the private costs in the event of enforcement action by 
tax authorities. These private managerial costs, which include potential job and reputation loss 
and other private penalties, are likely significant. If shareholders’ assessment of the cost-benefit 
                                                          
1 As in the prior literature referenced here, we use “tax avoidance” as a neutral term to represent a spectrum of 
strategies that reduce explicit taxes.   
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tradeoff of tax avoidance is different from managers’ private assessment of this tradeoff, then 
changes in ownership structure likely hold explanatory power for corporate tax avoidance.  
Following the Bushee (1998, 2001) classification of institutional investors, we refer to 
quasi-indexers as investors with passive and diversified holdings, transient investors as those 
with short-run holdings and active trading, and dedicated investors as those with passive and 
concentrated holdings. Our hypotheses and tests relate primarily to quasi-indexers. Institutional 
investors, including quasi-indexers, mitigate the collective-action problem among shareholders 
and are well placed to monitor and influence managerial action. Quasi-indexers’ investment 
mandate limits their flexibility to “vote with their feet,” and thereby provides an incentive for 
them to influence managerial actions (Monks and Minow 1995).2 This influence can be exercised 
through institutional investors’ “say on pay,” and through support for other activist shareholders 
(e.g., hedge funds as in Cheng et al. 2012) who promote a particular action. 
Quasi-indexers need not explicitly and specifically promote tax avoidance for two 
reasons. First, their interest is in increasing shareholders’ share of earnings (or after-tax income), 
and therefore any combination of feasible cost-reduction strategies chosen by managers will do. 
Managers likely have heightened incentive to show better after-tax performance in order to 
justify their compensation to new institutional investors who, as new owners, are likely to more 
keenly assess the pay-performance relation.3 In this scenario taxes are just another line-item 
expense, and institutional owners do not have to explicitly dictate which line item – taxes, R&D, 
advertising, payroll, or other expenses – managers should manage better. Instead, their 
                                                          
2 On the other hand, Porter (1992) suggests that quasi-indexers’ diversified holdings reduce their incentives to 
monitor managers.   
3 For example, State Street Global Advisors notes in its March 2015 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines that 
it “supports management proposals on executive compensation where there is a strong relation between executive 
pay and performance.”  Vanguard notes in a similar document that it considers “effective linkage between pay and 
performance over time.” 
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expectation is simply of higher profit margin, and managers then determine how to increase 
profitability. As such, as long as tax avoidance is one strategy employed by managers to improve 
after-tax performance, we expect a positive relation between tax avoidance and institutional 
ownership even in the absence of institutional owners specifically and explicitly promoting tax 
avoidance.  
Second, tax avoidance is a politically charged topic that can attract unfavorable attention 
from media, government, and consumer and public interest groups toward both the firm and its 
large investors in a phenomenon referred to as “tax-shaming” (Barford and Holt 2013). Many 
quasi-indexers manage pension and other funds for large portions of the general public, and tax-
shaming could result in adverse private consequences for managers of these funds. Of course, 
these same fund managers would likely enjoy private benefits (e.g., compensation and job 
prospects) from tax avoidance that results in improved firm and fund performance. This implies 
that institutional investors are unlikely to explicitly promote tax avoidance, relying instead on the 
latent demand implicit in their demand for better firm financial performance or on private 
communication to that effect. As an example, many public pension funds conspicuously stayed 
silent even when prompted by media for their comments on tax inverters in their investment 
portfolios, implying some tacit approval from these funds (Sorkin 2014). Overall, our hypothesis 
is that managers “deliver” tax avoidance when institutional ownership increases, rather than that 
institutional owners explicitly and specifically demand tax avoidance.4 
A key issue in testing the relation between tax avoidance and institutional ownership is 
that institutional ownership is endogenous. We overcome this hurdle by exploiting exogenous 
shocks to institutional ownership resulting from the annual reconstitution of the Russell 1000 and 
                                                          
4 Some institutional investors appear to publicly indicate an interest in certain tax issues as suggested in the proxy 
voting guidelines of Blackrock and Vanguard (available at www.blackrock.com and www.vanguard.com).  
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2000 indices (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015; Boone and White 2015). Each June, Russell 
assigns firms by market capitalization into the 1000 Index (largest 1000 firms) and the 2000 
Index (next-largest 2000 firms). The Russell indices are mimicked by many institutional 
investors (quasi-indexers), and therefore the annual reconstitution leads to changes in 
institutional holdings that are plausibly exogenous to the firm.  
In conjunction with the exogenous shock, our empirical strategy employs a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) that permits cleaner identification. Two key features of the Russell 
1000 and 2000 indices facilitate the RDD. First, while firms can influence their market 
capitalization, they likely have less control over their relative market capitalization ranking. The 
Russell index assignment is determined by relative size, rather than size itself. As such, firms at 
the threshold between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices (hereafter “threshold”) likely have 
imperfect control over which index they are assigned to, implying that assignment at the 
threshold is effectively locally randomized. Second, since the Russell 1000 and 2000 are value-
weighted benchmarks, quasi-indexers can minimize transaction costs without significantly 
increasing tracking error by avoiding holding firms at the bottom of each index (since the 
weights on the smallest firms in each index are effectively negligible). Due to this, Chang et al. 
(2015) show that stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 have index weights that are ten times (10 
x) the index weights of firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000. As a result, firms that cross the 
threshold by migrating from the bottom of the Russell 1000 to the top of the Russell 2000 have a 
significant and discontinuous jump in institutional ownership.    
It is useful to note another important feature of this setting: There is typically a sizable 
positive correlation between institutional ownership and firm size that has the potential to 
confound inferences relating to institutional ownership. In the Russell index setting however, this 
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positive correlation is broken at the threshold. Firms that become smaller and move from the 
bottom of the 1000 to the top of the 2000 index experience a discontinuous increase in 
institutional ownership.  
The key to the RDD identification strategy is to show that a discontinuous jump in 
institutional ownership at the threshold is followed by a similar discontinuous jump in tax 
avoidance at the threshold. As such, the RDD compares firms in the immediate neighborhood of 
the threshold. This is important because any alternative explanation relying on an omitted 
variable X (for example, X = firm performance) has to show that X similarly jumps 
discontinuously at, rather than changing smoothly across, what is essentially an arbitrary 
threshold used by Russell Investments. Collectively the identification strategy adopted here 
mitigates concerns about endogeneity. 
We use measures of tax avoidance that are common in the prior literature (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010; Chen et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2012; Badertscher et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 
2014). The primary measures are effective tax rate (ETR) measures: The GAAP ETR and the 
Cash ETR which are, respectively, the ratio of tax expense and the ratio of cash taxes to pre-tax 
income. These measures reflect non-conforming tax avoidance and are appropriate for our 
sample of public companies where reported book income is important to investors (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010). Results are robust to measures of the difference between book income and 
estimated taxable income (BTD): The Manzon and Plesko (2002) BTD and the Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) abnormal BTD. For ease of presentation we adjust the signs of the tax 
avoidance measures so that an increase in any measure indicates an increase in tax avoidance.5 
                                                          
5 Since a decrease in ETR measures indicates an increase in tax avoidance, we multiply the ETR measures by -1 so 
that higher ETR, like higher BTD, indicates higher tax avoidance. 
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We refer to firms immediately to the right of the threshold and falling at the top of the 
Russell 2000 as treatment firms, and firms immediately to the left of the threshold and falling at 
the bottom of the Russell 1000 as control firms. Results indicate that there is no discontinuity at 
the threshold in 16 of 17 firm characteristics that have previously been shown to determine tax 
avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010), and a sharp discontinuity in institutional ownership as 
expected.6 Non-parametric estimation of an RDD reveals a sharp and significant discontinuity in 
tax avoidance at the threshold, with ETR and CETR being five to seven percentage points higher 
for treatment firms compared to control firms. To hone the evidence further, we conduct a 
switching analysis by examining tax avoidance at firms that switch from one index to another, at 
the threshold, in a given year. Results indicate significant increases in tax avoidance for firms 
that move down from the bottom of the Russell 1000 to the top of the Russell 2000. Finally, in 
falsification tests we examine whether there are discontinuities in tax avoidance at random 
thresholds such as 500, 1500, 2000, and 2500, and do not find any discontinuities as expected.   
We next examine the form of tax avoidance and how firms benefit from tax avoidance 
following Russell 2000 inclusion, in order to shed some light on the economics of the tax 
avoidance decision. Tax avoidance encompasses activities that form a spectrum of 
aggressiveness. We expect the incremental tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion is 
more likely to come from the relatively more aggressive, rather than the relatively less 
aggressive, side of this spectrum, if firms have previously already exploited some tax avoidance 
activities (i.e., as long as prior tax avoidance is not zero on average). As such, we examine tax 
shelters as they represent the more aggressive segment of the spectrum of tax avoidance 
activities and indicate intentional tax planning (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Wilson 2009). 
                                                          
6 One firm characteristic, sales growth, is significantly lower for firms at the top of the Russell 2000 compared to 
firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000.   
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Results indicate a significant discontinuity in the use of tax shelters at the Russell 2000 
threshold, indicating that firms just to the right of the threshold are significantly more likely to 
use tax shelters than firms just to the left of the threshold.   
The final set of tests examines some immediate benefits from tax avoidance. Graham, 
Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) report survey evidence that 57 percent of CEOs view 
increasing earnings as an important outcome of tax planning, and Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 
(2004) suggest tax planning can be used to meet or beat earnings targets. We find a significant 
discontinuity in net income to sales margins, and the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecast targets (MBE), at the Russell 2000 index threshold. This result indicates that 
firms just to the right of the threshold have significantly higher net income margins and 
likelihood of MBE than firms just to the left of the threshold.  
One potential concern is the role of declining firm performance in explaining our results, 
since declining performance can move firms from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000. On one 
hand this concern is supported by the significantly lower sales growth, one performance 
measure, for firms at the top of the Russell 2000 relative to firms at the bottom of the Russell 
1000. On the other hand this concern is mitigated by some considerations: (i) an improvement 
(rather than decline) in firm performance can move firms to the top of the Russell 2000 from 
lower within the Russell 2000; (ii) there is no significant discontinuity at the Russell 2000 
threshold in other firm characteristics often used to capture performance, including profitability; 
and (iii) the results remain robust in panel regressions where we control for a host of firm 
characteristics, and in falsification tests around pseudo-thresholds.   
This paper is related to parallel papers by Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin (CHLS 2015) 
and Bird and Karolyi (BK 2016), who also use the Russell index setting to examine institutional 
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ownership and tax avoidance. In Appendix 2 we tabulate a comparison between these papers as a 
snapshot of key differences and similarities in sample, methodology, and results. We describe 
them here and also at the relevant places later in the text. In terms of sample, ours covers 19 
years (1988-2006), in contrast to the 11 years (1996-2006) in CHLS and BK. This is a 
meaningful increase in sample size because the Russell index is reconstituted only once a year. 
In terms of methodology we closely follow Boone and White (2015) in non-parametrically 
estimating an RDD in the main tests, while CHLS and BK use parametric or semi-parametric 
methods.7 Another methodological issue is which data points to use in identifying the 
discontinuity at the threshold (bandwidth issue). In this paper, we use firms very close to the 
threshold in identifying the discontinuity using the theoretically optimal bandwidth derived in 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), since these firms are more similar to each other. CHLS 
use fixed (but reasonable) bandwidths of 500 to 300 firms, but BK use all firms in the Russell 
1000 and 2000 indices regardless of distance from the threshold in their main tests. Firms 
become less similar as their distance from the threshold grows, and as Lee and Lemieux (2010) 
note, using “data far away from the cutoff point to predict the value of Y at the cutoff point is not 
intuitively appealing.” 
Finally, in terms of results, all three papers find a significantly positive relation between 
institutional ownership and tax avoidance for all tax avoidance measures, with similar 
magnitudes where comparable. We, and BK, find significant use of tax shelters, while CHLS do 
not. To balance out the evidence on costly tax avoidance, we further document benefits in the 
                                                          
7 Non-parametric (parametric) estimates are free from (dependent on) assumptions about the underlying functional 
form. Lee and Lemieux (2010, 316) note that “(T)he consequences of using an incorrect functional form are more 
serious in the case of RD designs however, since mis-specification of the functional form typically generates a bias 
in the treatment effect, τ. This explains why, starting with Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001), the estimation of 
RD designs have generally been viewed as a nonparametric estimation problem.” Further, Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) note that, in the presence of an unknown functional form, it is easy for a continuous but nonlinear relation at 
the threshold to be mistaken for a discontinuity at the threshold. These observations motivate our preference for non-
parametric estimation of the RDD. 
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form of higher net income margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings 
forecasts (unexamined in CHLS and BK). CHLS find that results are largely unaffected by 
corporate governance and firm information environment, while BK find some effect of corporate 
governance. We find some evidence for an executive equity compensation effect through delta 
and vega (Core and Guay 1999; Guay 1999), while BK also find an effect through the level of 
equity compensation. CHLS find an effect in federal and state taxes but not foreign taxes, while 
BK find an effect in foreign tax havens.  
This paper is also related to Khurana and Moser (2013) who examine the relation 
between institutional investors and tax avoidance, but is distinct in two important ways: (i) Our 
empirical identification strategy exploits an exogenous shock to institutional ownership and a 
regression discontinuity design to overcome concerns about endogeneity; and, (ii) Using more 
powerful tests we find a positive relation between institutional ownership and tax avoidance, in 
contrast to the negative relation documented in Khurana and Moser (2013). 
The results contribute to the literature on corporate income tax avoidance. Dyreng et al. 
(2010) note that evidence on the determinants of tax avoidance remains limited despite long-
standing and widespread interest in the area, and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) encourage 
researchers to explore agency frictions as an explanation. Our results suggest that an increase in 
ownership concentration increases tax avoidance. We further provide evidence on some 
immediate costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance, thereby shedding light on the 
economic tradeoffs involved. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides some background on the 
prior literature and the empirical setting. Section III describes the regression discontinuity design 
and the data. Section IV presents the main empirical results, and Section V describes the audit 
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fee tests. Section VI describes additional tests, and Section VII concludes. Appendix 1 presents 
detailed data definitions, and Appendix 2 tabulates a comparison between this paper, CHLS 
(2015) and BK (2016). 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we describe the prior literature on corporate tax avoidance and the Russell index 
reconstitution setting. 
Tax Avoidance and Agency Frictions 
Tax avoidance, or the reduction of explicit taxes, is the outcome of a spectrum of 
activities ranging from investments in tax-exempt assets such as municipal bonds to aggressive 
non-compliance schemes. As in the prior literature (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), we adopt an 
“outcome-based” rather than an “input-based” definition and do not distinguish between the 
types of activities that result in the reduction of explicit taxes. Corporate tax avoidance is of 
significant interest to a variety of groups but academic understanding of its determinants, unlike 
that for individual tax avoidance, is still evolving and has led tax scholars to call for further 
research (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
A more recent theory of corporate tax avoidance is developed in Slemrod (2004), Crocker 
and Slemrod (2005), and Chen and Chu (2005) who propose a role for manager-shareholder 
agency conflicts in determining tax avoidance. Are managers misaligned with shareholders in 
setting the level of tax avoidance? Some recent evidence on this question is provided in Chen et 
al. (2010), Cheng et al. (2012), Badertscher et al. (2013), and McGuire et al. (2014). We build 
directly on the agency perspective and examine whether higher institutional ownership is 
associated with higher tax avoidance.  
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Bushee (1998, 2001) classifies institutional investors in terms of their horizon and 
diversification. Transient institutional investors have short horizons, trade frequently, and are 
diversified. Quasi-indexers have long horizons and are diversified. Dedicated investors have long 
horizons and concentrated holdings. Of these three types of institutional investors, transient 
investors are less likely to expend effort to monitor and advocate on shareholder behalf because 
structural changes are unlikely to occur and bear fruit within their short trading horizon (Boone 
and White 2015). Quasi-indexers on the other hand have a fiduciary duty to preserve shareholder 
value, and the leverage to influence managerial actions (Monks and Minow 1995). In addition, 
their inability to exit investments at will (or “vote with their feet”) could increase their incentives 
to monitor and advocate at any individual firm. Finally, dedicated investors have the incentive 
and ability to monitor and advocate, but are not the subject of this study since their holdings do 
not respond mechanically to index reconstitution. 
A key contribution of this study is to overcome the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration more effectively through an exogenous shock to institutional ownership as 
described next. 
The Russell Index Reconstitution Setting 
The Russell 1000 (2000) index consists of the largest 1000 (next-largest 2000) publicly 
listed firms by market capitalization. Russell Investments assigns firms to these value-weighted 
indices based on their market value on the last trading day of May each year, and calculates their 
index weights on the last Friday of June. Depending on their relative market capitalization firms 
can move from one index to another. At the threshold between the 1000 and 2000 indices in 
particular, small changes in relative market capitalization can result in reassignment from one 
index to another. 
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Considerable institutional capital is benchmarked to the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices. 
Chang et al. (2015) report that $169 billion ($264 billion) is benchmarked to the 1000 (2000) 
index in 2008. Indexing strategies attempt to minimize benchmark tracking error, and since the 
Russell indices are value-weighted, firms at the top of each index (the largest firms in that index) 
are much more important sources of tracking error than firms at the bottom of each index (the 
smallest firms in that index). In particular, since the weights on firms at the bottom of these 
indices are relatively trivial, quasi-indexers can avoid the transaction costs associated with 
holding the smallest firms in any given index without significantly increasing index tracking 
error. This leads to a significant asymmetry in institutional ownership at the threshold of the 
1000 and 2000 indices: While firms on either side of the threshold are similar in size, firms at the 
top of the Russell 2000 have ten times the index weights of firms at the bottom the Russell 1000 
(Chang et al. 2015). Firms at the bottom of the 1000 index therefore have low institutional 
ownership, while firms at the top of the 2000 index have high institutional ownership.  
The Russell index reconstitution setting has been used in Boone and White (2015), Chang 
et al. (2015), and Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), among others, to examine the relation 
between institutional ownership and management earnings forecasts, price pressure from index 
changes, and corporate governance. We extend this literature by examining the effect of 
institutional ownership on corporate tax avoidance. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY, AND DATA 
We exploit firms at the threshold between the 1000 and 2000 indices for sharp 
identification. Small relative movements in market capitalization can cause threshold firms in the 
1000 index to be reassigned to the 2000 index or vice versa, and thereby to experience a 
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significant change in institutional ownership. In the language of the regression discontinuity 
design (RDD), market capitalization is expected to be locally smooth across the threshold, but 
institutional ownership is expected to jump discontinuously at the threshold. We therefore use a 
RDD to test for discontinuities in tax avoidance at the threshold. As long as firms cannot 
precisely manipulate their relative market capitalization ranking, index assignment at the 
threshold is effectively locally randomized (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
The RDD is estimated non-parametrically (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001; Lee 
and Lemieux 2010; Tan 2013; Gao, Khan, and Tan 2016) to allow flexible function forms. As 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) note, the inclusion of baseline covariates (independent variables) is 
irrelevant in the RDD given the locally randomized assignment to the treatment sample (and we 
verify in Section 4.1 below that firms around the threshold do not have significant differences in 
firm characteristics, consistent with locally randomized assignment). Essentially the RDD can be 
seen as testing whether tax avoidance at firms just to the left of the threshold differs from tax 
avoidance at firms just to the right of the threshold. If assignment of firms immediately to the left 
or the right of the threshold is effectively locally randomized, then the two sets of firms are 
expected to be identical in all dimensions except for the treatment effect. We use the 
theoretically derived optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014) to determine the number of 
firms on either side of the threshold used to identify the discontinuity. (In robustness tests we 
also estimate a parametric panel regression of tax avoidance on its known determinants from the 
prior literature). Our methodology differs from CHLS (2015) and BK (2016) who use parametric 
or semi-parametric methods to identify the discontinuity in their main tests. In model estimation, 
BK also use all firms in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices regardless of distance from the 
threshold in their main tests.  
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The data on the Russell index constituents and weights are from Russell Investments and 
cover the period 1979-2013. As in Chang et al. (2015) and Boone and White (2015), we do not 
use post-2006 data because Russell Investments initiated a banding policy in 2007 to reduce 
index turnover by keeping threshold index members in their original index if their market 
capitalization did not change significantly. As such, we begin with 1979-2006 data from Russell 
Investments. The institutional ownership data are from Thompson, and accounting data are from 
Compustat. Data from the Statement of Cash Flows is available from 1988 on Compustat, and is 
needed to calculate the cash ETR tax avoidance measure. As such, our final sample covers the 19 
years from 1988 to 2006. It is important to note that time-series length is particularly helpful 
since the Russell index is reconstituted once a year. CHLS (2015) and BK (2016) in contrast 
have 11 years of data (1996-2006) in their sample. 
Our primary tax avoidance measures are the GAAP effective tax rate, ETR, and the cash 
effective tax rate, cash ETR. ETR is the tax expense as a percent of pretax income, and captures 
tax avoidance resulting from permanent book-tax differences rather than from tax deferral. 
Investments in tax-exempt assets such as municipal bonds, and foreign earnings permanently 
reinvested in a lower tax jurisdiction, are examples of tax avoidance strategies that would be 
reflected in the ETR. Cash ETR is the cash taxes paid as a percent of pretax income, and captures 
tax avoidance resulting from deferral strategies. In addition, unlike the ETR, the cash ETR is not 
affected by items such as changes in the tax contingency reserves that are not tax planning 
strategies (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Both ETR and cash ETR are widely used tax avoidance 
measures. We multiply both ETR and CETR by -1 so that an increase in ETR or CETR reflects 
an increase in tax avoidance. 
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IV. RESULTS ON INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
Timing of Dependent Variables  
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the dependent variables used in our tests. Firms are 
added to the Russell 2000 index at the end of June each year, and at this point experience an 
increase in institutional ownership. The issue is how much time to allow managers to respond to 
this change by increasing tax avoidance activities. Consider a firm with December fiscal year-
end which is added to the Russell 2000 on June 30, 2001. If we examine its ETR from financial 
statements dated December 31, 2001 then we have effectively allowed managers only six months 
to respond, which may be insufficient time. We therefore calculate ETR and CETR from 
financial statements dated December 31, 2002 for this firm, effectively allowing managers 18 
months to respond for December fiscal-year-end firms. More generally Figure 1 shows that for 
about 86 percent of firm-years corresponding to firms with fiscal year-end from June through 
December, the managerial response time we allow increases from 12 months to 18 months, 
respectively. For less than 14 percent of firm-years corresponding to firms with fiscal year-end 
from January through May, the managerial response time we allow increases from 7 months to 
11 months, respectively. Results are robust to using only firms with June through December 
fiscal year-end. 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
Descriptives  
Panel A of Figure 2 shows index weights of firms in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices.8 
The “cutoff” for index assignment is the threshold between the indices, and firms to the left 
(right) of the cutoff are in the 1000 (2000) index. Index weights decline considerably from the 
                                                          
8 The Russell 1000/2000 indexes include common equities, and exclude preferred stocks, closed-end mutual funds, 
limited partnerships, royalty trusts, and REITs. 
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top to the bottom of the 1000, but exhibit a sharp and discontinuous tenfold jump at the cutoff, 
implying that index weights for firms at the top of the 2000 index are discontinuously higher 
than those for firms at the bottom of the 1000 index. Panels B through E show total institutional 
ownership, dedicated investor ownership, quasi-indexer ownership, and transient investor 
ownership, respectively, in firms around the cutoff. The graphs show a large discontinuity in 
total, quasi-indexer, and transient institutional investor ownership at the cutoff such that 
ownership is higher at the top of the 2000 index than at the bottom of the 1000 index. In contrast, 
dedicated investor ownership in Panel C appears lower for firms at the top of the 2000 index than 
for firms at the bottom of the 1000 index.  
< INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
Panels A and B of Figure 3 show the tax avoidance measures for firms in the 1000 and 
2000 indices. Both ETR and CETR exhibit a discontinuity at the cutoff that mirrors the 
discontinuity in quasi-indexer ownership seen in Figure 2. The statistical significance of these 
patterns is examined shortly. 
< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
Table 1 reports the distribution of variables used in the study for the 200 firms at the 
bottom of the Russell 1000 index (left of the threshold) and the 200 firms at the top of the 
Russell 2000 index (right of the threshold). The mean ETR and CETR of -0.33 and -0.27, 
respectively, for firms on the left indicate an effective tax rate of 33 percent and a cash effective 
tax rate of 27 percent (recall that we have multiplied ETR and CETR by -1). For firms on the 
right, the mean ETR and CETR are 31 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Mean institutional 
ownership is 48 percent (55 percent) for firms on the left (right), while mean quasi-indexer 
ownership is 29 percent (35 percent) for firms on the left (right). Table 2 reports correlations 
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between the variables. ETR and CETR have a Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.42 (0.41), 
indicating ETR and CETR capture some common, but also some distinct, aspects of tax 
avoidance. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
Table 3 examines the statistical significance of the discontinuity in institutional 
ownership at the cutoff. Panel A reports mean differences in institutional ownership, while Panel 
B reports RDD estimates of the discontinuity in institutional ownership at the threshold. There 
are four rows of estimates in Panel A, one each for total institutional ownership, dedicated 
investor ownership, quasi-indexer ownership and transient investor ownership. The panel shows 
average institutional ownership for bandwidths of 200, 100, and 50 firms on either side of the 
cutoff as indicated in the column headers. The bandwidth choice involves a tradeoff between 
efficiency and bias, and we therefore examine three different bandwidths. The columns labeled 
“Difference” show statistical significance from tests of differences in average institutional 
ownership between firms at the left versus the right of the cutoff. Panel A of Table 1 reveals two 
patterns: Firms at the top of the Russell 2000 have significantly higher total, quasi-indexer, and 
transient institutional ownership than firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000, on average; and, 
the magnitude of the difference increases as we zoom closer to the cutoff by decreasing the 
bandwidth examined. The difference in averages from smaller bandwidths approaches the 
estimate of discontinuity at the cutoff.  
< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the magnitudes and statistical significance of RDD estimates of 
the discontinuity in institutional ownership at the index threshold. The non-parametric estimates 
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use the optimal bandwidth and a triangle kernel from Calonico et al. (2014). The kernel controls 
the weights placed on observations, with a triangle kernel placing more weight on observations 
closer to the threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Panel B formally shows significant 
discontinuities in total, quasi-indexer, and transient institutional ownership at the threshold, with 
quasi-indexer ownership being 19.9 percentage points higher for firms at the top of the 2000 
index relative to firms at the bottom of the 1000 index. 
 
Main Results 
Panel A of Table 4 examines bandwidths of 200, 100, and 50 firms on either side of the 
threshold, and shows means of various firm characteristics. The firm characteristics are those 
shown in the prior literature to be determinants of tax avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). The 
panel shows that firms at the top of the 2000 index are significantly smaller than firms at the 
bottom of the 1000 index, by construction, and generally shows insignificant differences except 
for some variables and some bandwidths. Given the large number of firm characteristics and 
various bandwidths tested, some randomly significant differences are not unexpected.  
< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
More important for our purposes is to test for any discontinuity in firm characteristics at 
the threshold. We do this in Panel B of Table 4, which shows no significant discontinuity in any 
firm characteristic except sales growth. In particular, while Panel A shows a significant 
difference in firm size on either side of the threshold, Panel B shows that firm size changes 
smoothly, not discontinuously, at the threshold. In other words, firm size does not jump 
discontinuously at the threshold. This smoothness is explained by the fact that index assignment 
depends on relative size, so there is no reason to expect a discontinuity in size at the threshold. 
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Collectively the results in Panels A and B of Table 4 are consistent with the notion that index 
assignment at the threshold is effectively locally randomized, which supports the validity of 
RDD tests on tax avoidance (Lee and Lemieux 2010). However, to the extent the significant 
discontinuity in sales growth weakens the locally randomized assignment requirement for RDD, 
the effectiveness of the RDD is subject to qualification. 
Non-parametric Tests  
Panel A of Table 5 shows mean differences in ETR and CETR for bandwidths of 200, 
100, and 50 firms around the threshold. The table shows significant mean differences in both tax 
avoidance measures as we zoom closer to the threshold by examining smaller bandwidths. The 
magnitudes of the differences are also larger as the bandwidth narrows. Panel B of Table 5 
formally tests for a discontinuity in tax avoidance around the threshold using a non-parametric 
RDD method that does not rely on assuming a specific functional form for how tax avoidance 
varies with the distance from the threshold. In other words, the non-parametric method fits the 
function to the data. As panel B shows, non-parametric RDD estimates of tax avoidance are 
statistically significant for both measures at p-values < 0.01, indicating that tax avoidance jumps 
discontinuously at the Russell index threshold. The magnitudes of the discontinuity estimates 
range from 5.1 percent for total ETR to 7 percent for cash ETR. These results are consistent with 
those in CHLS (2015) and BK (2016). 
< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
Switching Analysis  
In order to enhance identification we examine tax avoidance only at firms that switch 
from the Russell 1000 to the 2000 index (excluding firms that never switch) within a narrow 
(optimal) bandwidth close to the threshold. The switching sample includes one pre-switch and 
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one post-switch observation for each switching firm, effectively comparing the average 
dependent variable after the switch relative to the average dependent variable prior to the switch. 
Panel C of Table 5 shows RDD estimates of the discontinuity in tax avoidance as firms switch 
into the Russell 2000 index. Both tax avoidance measures show a significant increase (p-value < 
0.01) in tax avoidance as firms move down to the Russell 2000 index. The switching sample 
analysis is not available in CHLS (2015), or in BK (2016) for firms switching within a narrow 
bandwidth of the threshold (BK include all switchers regardless of distance from the threshold in 
their tests). 
Falsification Tests  
In our setting, the treatment effect (an exogenous increase in institutional ownership) is 
administered when a firm crosses from the Russell 1000 to the 2000 index, and this threshold 
between the two indices is where we look for a discontinuous jump in tax avoidance. The 
implication is that the tax avoidance is a consequence of the treatment. As a falsification test we 
also examine whether there is a discontinuity in tax avoidance around a series of hypothetical 
Russell index cutoffs. In particular, we examine whether there is a discontinuity in tax avoidance 
at firms immediately to the right, versus immediately to the left, of the Russell 500 cutoff, and 
repeat this exercise for the Russell 1500, 2000, and 2500 cutoffs. Results shown in Panel D of 
Table 5 indicate no significant discontinuity in tax avoidance at any of these cutoffs, as expected. 
A falsification test at pseudo-thresholds is also available in CHLS (2015) and BK (2016). 
This test is also helpful in mitigating a potential concern that a decline in firm 
performance moves firms from the bottom of the Russell 1000 to the top of the Russell 2000, and 
that declining firm performance explains the increase in tax avoidance. The same declining firm 
performance can similarly lead firms from the left to the right of the 500, 1500, 2000, and 2500 
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thresholds, but we do not observe a discontinuity in tax avoidance at these thresholds. This 
appears more consistent with tax avoidance being associated with changes in institutional 
ownership at the 1000 threshold, rather than with declining firm performance. 
Collectively the results in Table 5 provide strong evidence of the impact of quasi-
indexers on corporate tax avoidance.  
 
V. FORM AND BENEFITS OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
 In this section we examine the form of tax avoidance and the economics of the decision. 
Section 5.1 explores the use of tax shelters following Russell 2000 inclusion. Section 5.2 
explores immediate benefits of tax avoidance in the form of net income margins and the 
likelihood of meeting or beating earnings targets. 
Tax Shelters  
Tax avoidance results from activities that cover a spectrum of aggressiveness, ranging 
from the use of available tax exemptions to more complicated schemes that test the boundaries of 
compliance. We examine the use of tax shelters following Russell 2000 inclusion. Tax shelters 
cover the more aggressive segment of the avoidance spectrum, and are likely to be used if firms 
have already previously exploited the “easier” or less aggressive avoidance strategies. We use a 
model-implied measure of the use of tax shelters as developed in Wilson (2009), which is based 
on firm characteristics known to be associated with tax shelter use. These variables include the 
book-tax difference, discretionary accruals, leverage, size, profitability, foreign income, and 
R&D (Wilson 2009). Table 6 shows results from non-parametric estimation of the discontinuity 
in tax shelter use. The analysis compares tax shelter use by firms just to the right of the Russell 
2000 index threshold versus firms just to the left of the threshold. The coefficient of the Russell 
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2000 indicator is significant (p-value < 0.01), indicating that tax avoidance by firms at the top of 
the Russell 2000 involves the use of tax shelters. BK (2016) also find a significant use of tax 
shelters consistent with our results, though CHLS (2015) find no significant use of tax shelters.  
< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
Net Income Margins, and Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations 
In order to obtain a richer picture of the economics of the tax avoidance decision we 
examine immediate benefits associated with tax avoidance. Tax avoidance increases after-tax 
income, and CEOs are reported in Graham et al. (2014) to believe that it can be used to increase 
earnings-per-share (EPS). In addition, Dhaliwal et al. (2004) suggest tax avoidance can be used 
to meet or beat analyst earnings expectations. We therefore examine net income margins and the 
likelihood of meeting or beating earnings expectations after Russell 2000 inclusion. 
Table 7 reports results on net income margin, which is the ratio of after-tax income to 
sales. The analysis compares net income margins at firms just to the right, versus firms just to the 
left, of the Russell 2000 index threshold. The Russell 2000 coefficient in Table 7 shows that net 
income margins are discontinuously and significantly higher (p-value < 0.01) at firms at the top 
of the Russell 2000 index. 
< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE > 
Table 8 examines the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations of annual 
earnings. The analysis compares actual earnings to the median of the last forecast of annual 
earnings. A firm is identified as meeting or beating the forecast if it meets or beats the consensus 
forecast by two cents or less. The Russell 2000 coefficient in Table 8 shows that the likelihood of 
meeting or beating earnings expectations is discontinuously and significantly higher (p-value < 
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0.05) at firms at the top of the Russell 2000 index, compared to firms at the bottom of the Russell 
1000 index. 
< INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE > 
Collectively the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that firms at the top of the Russell 2000 
index have discontinuously higher outcomes in performance variables that are closely tracked by 
equity investors. This analysis is not available in CHLS (2015) or BK (2016). 
 
VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Multi-year Tax Avoidance Measures  
We examine three-year ETR and CETR, labeled ETR3 and CETR3, in order to shed light 
on long-run tax avoidance at Russell 2000 firms. In untabulated non-parametric RDD tests, the 
Russell 2000 coefficient is 0.047 (p-value < 0.01) when ETR3 is the dependent variable, and 
0.065 (p-value < 0.01) when CETR3 is the dependent variable. This indicates ETR3 and CETR3 
are discontinuously higher at firms just to the right of the Russell 2000 index threshold, 
compared to firms just to the left of the threshold.  
Panel Regressions  
To obtain parametric estimates of the tax avoidance effect we estimate panel regressions 
of the two tax avoidance measures (ETR and CETR) on an indicator for firms in the Russell 
2000 index (RU2000), indicators for firm distance, squared distance, and cubed distance on both 
the left and the right of the threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010), and known determinants of tax 
avoidance. The distance from the threshold is such that negative (positive) distance signals 
inclusion in the Russell 1000 (2000) index, and controlling for the distance in the regression 
allows interpretation of the Russell 2000 indicator as the discontinuity at the threshold. The 
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regressions control for known determinants of tax avoidance (e.g., Chen et al. 2010) including 
firm size, book-to-market, profitability, leverage, fixed assets (PP&E), intangibles, the level of 
and change in tax-loss carryforwards, pretax foreign income, and equity income. The regressions 
also include industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen 
2009). These regressions are similar to the parametric models in CHLS (2015) and BK (2016). 
Untabulated results show that the RU2000 indicator is 0.020 (p-value < 0.01) when ETR 
is the dependent variable, and 0.024 (p-value < 0.01) when CETR is the dependent variable. The 
magnitudes of the discontinuity estimates are less than one-half of the non-parametric estimates 
in Panel B of Table 5. One reason for this is that the panel regressions fit the data to the full 
sample, which includes firms far from the threshold that are different from firms at the threshold. 
The discontinuity estimate in Table 5 in contrast is obtained by examining firms close to the 
threshold. 
Panel Regressions with Additional Controls  
We re-estimate the panel regressions with a host of other control variables. These include 
excess tax benefits of stock compensation since exercises of stock-based compensation affect the 
cash ETR, R&D expenses to capture R&D tax credits, advertising expenses as another proxy for 
intellectual property, SG&A and capital expenditures to capture business deductions, sales 
growth as an additional performance measure, and the magnitude of multinationality as indicated 
by the ratio of foreign to total pre-tax income. Untabulated results are robust, as the coefficient of 
the RU2000 indicator is 0.018 (p-value < 0.01) when ETR is the dependent variable, and 0.022 
(p-value < 0.01) when CETR is the dependent variable.  
Extending the specification above, we re-estimate the regressions controlling for two 
measures of executive compensation incentives, delta and vega (Core and Guay 1999; Guay 
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1999). Delta (vega) is the sensitivity of CEO stock and option holdings value to the stock return 
(stock return volatility), and managerial incentives have been shown to influence tax avoidance 
in Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010), Rego and Wilson (2012), Gaertner (2013), and Powers, 
Robinson, and Stomberg (2015). Untabulated results show that the Russell 2000 indicator is no 
longer significant. One interpretation of this result is that changes in managerial incentives are 
the mechanism through which changes in tax avoidance are incentivized. Consistent with this, 
we find significant discontinuities in delta and vega at the Russell index threshold. This appears 
to be an opportunity for future research.  
BK (2016) also examine the effect of executive equity compensation (CHLS do not) 
using the level of equity compensation and stock options as proxies. We follow Core and Guay 
(1999) and Guay (1999) in using delta and vega as better measures of executive equity 
incentives. BK (2016) find some evidence that tax avoidance occurs more in firms with 
previously low executive equity compensation, suggesting somewhat similar inferences as our 
result. 
Other Tax Avoidance Measures  
Two other tax avoidance measures used in the literature are based on differences between 
book income and estimated taxable income (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Chen et al. 2010; 
Cheng et al. 2012; Badertscher et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 2014). These are the Manzon and 
Plesko (2002) BTD and the Desai and Dharmapala (2006) abnormal BTD. The abnormal BTD 
controls for earnings management in an effort to capture intentional, rather than coincidental, tax 
avoidance. A portion of both BTD measures impacts accounting earnings, and they both reflect 
deferral strategies and nonconforming tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). We therefore 
examine robustness with respect to these measures of tax avoidance. 
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Untabulated non-parametric RDD estimates of the discontinuity in the two BTD 
measures at the threshold of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices show that results remain robust. 
When estimated in the full sample, the discontinuity estimate in BTD is 0.025 (p-value < 0.01), 
and the discontinuity estimate in abnormal BTD is 0.022 (p-value < 0.01). When estimated in the 
sample of firms that switch into the Russell 2000, the discontinuity estimate in BTD is 0.090 (p-
value < 0.01), and the discontinuity estimate in abnormal BTD is 0.070 (p-value < 0.01). These 
results are consistent with CHLS (2015) and BK (2016) who also use book-tax difference 
proxies for tax avoidance. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we find a significantly positive relation between institutional ownership and 
corporate income tax avoidance. Using an exogenous shock to quasi-indexer institutional 
ownership upon inclusion of firms to the Russell 2000 index, and a regression discontinuity 
design to facilitate sharper identification of treatment effects, we document significant 
discontinuities in effective tax rate measures and book-tax difference measures when firms are 
added to the Russell 2000. The results suggest ownership concentration has explanatory power 
for variation in tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; 
Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
We further examine the nature of tax avoidance activities and some immediate costs and 
benefits of tax avoidance for firms at the top of the Russell 2000 compared to firms at the bottom 
of the Russell 1000. Results indicate an increase in the use of tax shelters, which is a costly 
activity in the sense that tax shelters occupy the more complex segment of the spectrum of tax 
avoidance activities. Results also indicate an increase in net income margins and higher 
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likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations at firms at the top of the Russell 
2000, suggesting some immediate benefits of tax avoidance. 
Collectively the results respond to the call in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for evidence 
on determinants of corporate tax avoidance, and shed light on ownership concentration as an 
explanation for variation in tax avoidance. The results also add to an understanding of the 
immediate costs and benefits of tax avoidance. 
Combined with the results in Chen et al. (2015) and Bird and Karolyi (2016) who use 
different samples and methodologies, we view the positive relation between ownership 
concentration and tax avoidance as quite robust, and novel given the opposite conclusion from 
cross-sectional regressions in Khurana and Moser (2013). If tax planning is a costly and risky 
investment, it is helpful to have a sense of the costs and benefits. In this regard, our results and 
those of BK (2016) suggest that relatively more costly tax avoidance strategies (in the form of 
shelters) are used, and our results suggest capital market benefits through higher net income 
margins and meeting earnings expectations. Regarding the mechanism, our results and those of 
BK (2016) suggest executive equity incentives play a role in explaining tax avoidance. BK 
(2016) also suggest governance in the form of board changes as a mechanism, though our view is 
that board changes are perhaps a substantially more costly and visible mechanism than might be 
necessary. Institutional owners likely wield influence in more subtle ways, through their say-on-
pay, engagement in the form of “hundreds of direct discussions every year” with managers, and 
an “approach of quiet diplomacy” (Booraem 2013). Empirically identifying these subtle and 
perhaps varied mechanisms could potentially require new and perhaps hand-collected data. This 
represents one opportunity for future research. 
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Finally, one aspect we do not have insight on from any of the three papers is where the 
tax planning advice is acquired from. For example, do institutional owners themselves suggest 
specific tax avoidance strategies, and if so where do they acquire this knowledge from? Do firms 
tap into in-house tax planning expertise? Or do firms acquire advice from newly retained 
consultants? This represents another opportunity for future research, and answers to these 
questions can help round out our understanding of the role of ownership structure in corporate 
tax avoidance. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
ADVERT Advertising expense (XAD) / lagged total assets (AT). ADVERT is set to 0 when 
missing. 
 
CAPX Reported capital expenditures (CAPX) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
CETR Cash effective tax rate. Cash tax paid (TXPD) / (pre-tax book income (PI) - special 
items (SPI)). CETR is set to missing if the denominator is zero or negative and is 
truncated to the range [0, 1]. This is then multiplied by -1. 
 
CETR3 Three-year cash effective tax rate: three-year sum of cash tax paid (TXPD) / 
(three-year sum of pre-tax book income (PI) less special items (SPI)). CETR3 is 
set to missing if the denominator is zero or negative and is truncated to the range 
[0, 1]. This is then multiplied by -1. 
 
CNOL Change in tax loss carry forward (TLCF) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
DD_BTD Desai and Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference from the following 
firm fixed-effect regression: 
 
MP_BTDi,t = TAi,t + μi + εi,t, 
 
where MP_BTD is the Manzon and Plesko book-tax difference; TA is total 
accruals measured using the cash flow method (Hribar and Collins 2002). Both 
variables are scaled by lagged total assets (AT) and are winsorized at 1% and 
99%; μi is the average value of the residual for firm i over the sample period, and 
εi,t is the deviation of the residual in year t from firm i’s average residual. We 
remove observations with total assets less than $1 million (to mitigate small 
deflator problem) and observations with negative taxable income (TXFED<0).  
  
DED The quarterly percentage of shares outstanding held by dedicated institutional 
investors as reported on SEC’s Form 13-F filings. 
 
DELTA Dollar change in CEO wealth (the dollar value of CEO stock and option holdings) 
associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (in $000s) 
 
DISTANCEL The relative distance of a Russell 1000 firm to the cutoff firm (the 1,000th firm) 
each year based on June weights, 0 otherwise. 
 
DISTANCER The relative distance of a Russell 2000 firm to the cutoff firm (the 1,000th firm) 
each year based on June weights, 0 otherwise. 
 
EQINC Equity income (ESUB) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
ETR Effective tax rate: Total income tax expense (TXT) / (pre-tax book income (PI) - 
special items (SPI)). ETR is set to missing if the denominator is zero or negative 
and is truncated to the range [0, 1]. This is then multiplied by -1. 
 
ETR3 Three-year effective tax rate: three-year sum of income tax expenses (TXT) / 
(three-year sum of pre-tax book income (PI) less special items (SPI)). ETR3 is set 
to missing if the denominator is zero or negative and is truncated to the range [0, 
1]. This is then multiplied by -1. 
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EXTXB Excess tax benefit of stock options (TXBCO, TXBCFO if after 6/15/2006 when 
FAS 123 (R) becomes effective) / lagged total assets (AT). 
 
FODOM Foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) / total pre-tax income (PI). 
 
FORINC Pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
INSTOWN The quarterly percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors as 
reported on SEC’s Form 13-F filings. 
 
INTAN Intangible assets (INTANG) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
LEV Long-term debt (DLTT) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
MARGIN Net Income (NI) / sales (SALE) 
 
MBE An indicator variable that equals 1 if the reported EPS falls between analyst 
median consensus forecast and that plus two cents in a fiscal quarter, 0 otherwise. 
 
MKTCAP Market capitalization calculated at the end of May right before the index 
reconstitution. 
 
MP_BTD Manzon and Plesko (2002) book-tax difference. (U.S. domestic financial income 
(PIDOM) – U.S. domestic taxable income – State Income Taxes (TXS) – Other 
Income Taxes (TXO) – Equity in Earnings (ESUB)) / lagged total assets (AT). 
U.S. domestic taxable income is estimated as the federal tax expense (TXFED) / 
the statutory maximum corporate tax rate. We remove observations with total 
assets (AT) less than $1 million (to mitigate small deflator problem) and 
observations with negative taxable income (TXFED<0).  
 
MTB Market value of equity (PRCC_F × CSHO) / book value of equity (CEQ) at the 
beginning of year t. 
 
NOL An indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a tax loss carry forward (TLCF > 0) 
as of the beginning of the year t, 0 otherwise 
 
PPE Property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
QIX The quarterly percentage of shares outstanding held by quasi-indexer institutional 
investors as reported on SEC’s Form 13-F filings. 
 
ROA (pre-tax income (PI) - extraordinary items (XI)) / lagged total assets (AT) 
 
RU2000 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the Russell 2000 index, 0 
otherwise.  
 
R&D Research and development expense (XRD) / lagged total assets (AT). R&D is set 
to 0 when missing.  
 
SALEGR Sales growth ((SALE/lagged SALE) – 1) 
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SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expense (XSGA) / lagged total assets (AT). 
SG&A is set to 0 when missing. 
 
SHELTER SHELTER = -4.86 + (5.20 × BTD) + (4.08 × DAP) – (1.41 × LEV) + (0.76 × 
SIZE) + (3.51 × ROA) + (1.72 × FI) + (2.43 × R&D) 
 
where BTD is pre-tax book income less estimated taxable income scaled by lagged 
total assets. Estimated taxable income is current federal tax expense plus current 
foreign tax expense scaled by 0.35 less change in tax-loss carryforward; DAP is 
discretionary accruals from the performance-adjusted modified cross-sectional 
Jones Model; LEV is long-term debt divided by total assets; SIZE is log of total 
assets; ROA is pre-tax income divided by total assets; FI is an indicator equal to 1 
for firms with foreign income, 0 otherwise; R&D is R&D expense divided by 
lagged total assets. The formula is from Wilson (2009). 
 
SIZE Log (PRCC_F × CSHO) at the beginning of year t. 
 
TRAN The quarterly percentage of shares outstanding held by transient institutional 
investors as reported on SEC’s Form 13-F filings. 
 
VEGA Dollar change in CEO wealth (the dollar value of CEO stock and option holdings) 
associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns (in 
$000s) 
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Appendix 2: Comparison with Concurrent Papers 
 
 
 This paper Chen et al. (2015) Bird and Karolyi (2016) 
Sample Period:    
 1988 – 2006  1996 – 2006  1996 - 2006  
    
Methodology:    
   Estimation Method Non-parametric in main 
tests, parametric in 
robustness  
Parametric in main tests, 
two-stage IV in robustness 
Two-stage IV in main tests, 
non-parametric in 
robustness 
    
   Test sample (bandwidth)  Firms close to Index 
threshold (optimal 
bandwidth) 
Firms around Index 
threshold (bandwidth of 
500 to 300) 
All firms in Russell 1000 
and 2000 index (no 
bandwidth) in main tests 
    
   Falsification test at pseudo-  
thresholds 
Yes Yes Yes 
    
   Switching sample test Yes (switchers close to 
threshold only) 
No  Yes (all switchers 
regardless of distance from 
threshold)  
    
Results:    
   GAAP ETR & Cash ETR Lower Lower Lower 
    
   Book-tax differences Higher Higher Higher 
    
   Tax Shelter More No Difference More 
    
   Net Income Margin  Higher N/A N/A 
    
   Meet / Beat earnings                
forecast  
Higher N/A N/A 
    
   Tax jurisdiction N/A Lower Federal and State 
ETR, but not Foreign ETR 
Greater foreign tax planning 
    
   Executive Equity Incentives No differential tax 
avoidance after controlling 
for Delta and Vega in 
parametric tests, indicating 
equity incentives are 
potential mechanisms to 
influence managers 
N/A Some effect of equity 
incentive pay 
    
   Governance and information 
environment 
N/A Largely unaffected by 
governance and 
information environment  
Some effect of governance 
(information environment 
unexamined) 
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Figure 1 
Example to Illustrate Timing of Dependent Variables 
 
FYE 
Recon 
date Dependent Variable as of:             
% of 
Firm 
Years 
6 6/30/01                       6/30/02 
      
6.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
7 6/30/01                    7/31/02 
     
1.53 
8 6/30/01                      8/31/02 
    
1.59 
9 6/30/01                        9/30/02 
   
6.20 
10 6/30/01                          10/30/02 
  
2.20 
11 6/30/01                            11/30/02 
 
1.13 
12 6/30/01                              12/31/02 67.37 
1 6/30/01             1/31/02 
           
4.47 
2 6/30/01               2/28/02 
          
1.45 
3 6/30/01                 3/31/02 
         
4.28 
4 6/30/01                   4/30/02 
        
1.51 
5 6/30/01                     5/31/02               1.81 
 
This figure presents an example of the timing of dependent variables following the June index reconstitution. In this example, index reconstitution on June 30, 
2001 is used, but the illustration extends to reconstitution in any year. FYE indicates the fiscal year-end month, and % of firm-years indicates the proportion of 
the sample consisting of firms with the FYE indicated in the row. For firms with December fiscal year-end for example, the dependent variable is as of December 
30, 2002 in this case, and 67.37% of the sample consists of December fiscal year-end firms.   
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Figure 2 
Index Weight and Institutional Ownership at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
      
      
This figure presents graphical analyses of the end-of-June index weight and institutional holdings for firms around 
the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. The institutional holdings are calculated one quarter after the June index 
reconstitution. Panel A shows the index weight. Panel B shows the overall institutional holdings (INSTOWN). Panel 
C shows the dedicated institutional holdings (DED). Panel D shows the quasi-indexer institutional holdings (QIX). 
Panel E shows the transient institutional holdings (TRAN). The graphical analysis methodology follows Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). The horizontal axis is the relative distance of a firm to the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff. 
The solid black line represents the fourth-order non-parametric local polynomial regression on either side of the 
cutoff. The dots represent the local sample average within each optimal bin. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3 
Tax Avoidance at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
          
 
This figure presents graphical analyses of tax avoidance for firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Panel A 
shows the ETR measure. Panel B shows the CETR measure. The graphical analysis methodology follows Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). The horizontal axis is the relative distance of firm to the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff. 
The solid black line represents the fourth-order non-parametric local polynomial regression on either side of the 
cutoff. The dots represent the local sample average within each optimal bin. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  Russell 1000   Russell 2000 
 
Mean SD P25 Median P75 
 
Mean SD P25 Median P75 
ETR -0.33 0.12 -0.39 -0.35 -0.29 
 
-0.31 0.13 -0.38 -0.34 -0.27 
CETR -0.27 0.16 -0.36 -0.28 -0.17 
 
-0.26 0.17 -0.36 -0.26 -0.13 
ETR3 -0.32 0.12 -0.38 -0.34 -0.28  -0.30 0.13 -0.38 -0.34 -0.26 
CETR3 -0.28 0.15 -0.36 -0.28 -0.19  -0.26 0.16 -0.36 -0.27 -0.16 
MP_BTD -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.03  -0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
DD_BTD 0.02 0.08 -0.00 0.03 0.06  0.02 0.08 -0.00 0.03 0.06 
SHELTER 0.99 1.91 0.26 1.09 2.18 
 
0.77 1.72 -0.03 0.84 1.89 
MARGIN -0.00 0.55 0.02 0.06 0.11 
 
-0.01 0.59 0.02 0.06 0.12 
MBE 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
INTOWN 0.48 0.25 0.29 0.48 0.67 
 
0.55 0.24 0.37 0.57 0.75 
DED 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.11 
 
0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.11 
QIX 0.29 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.41 
 
0.35 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.47 
TRAN 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.17 
 
0.15 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.21 
MKTCAP 1.31 1.02 0.52 1.15 1.77 
 
0.82 0.49 0.34 0.81 1.19 
MTB 3.10 3.71 1.42 2.18 3.55 
 
2.88 3.18 1.45 2.08 3.20 
ROA 0.08 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.15 
 
0.08 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.14 
LEV 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.35 
 
0.25 0.25 0.03 0.21 0.36 
PPE 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.26 0.50 
 
0.33 0.29 0.09 0.26 0.50 
INTAN 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.17 
 
0.11 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.14 
NOL 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CNOL 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FORINC 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EQINC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R&D 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 
ADVERT 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SG&A 0.21 0.24 0.02 0.12 0.33 
 
0.21 0.24 0.01 0.13 0.32 
CAPX 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10 
 
0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.09 
SALEGR 0.15 0.31 0.01 0.10 0.21 
 
0.17 0.31 0.02 0.11 0.24 
EXTXB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FODOM 0.09 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.06 
 
0.10 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of firms within a bandwidth of 200 around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff 
from 1988 to 2006. The descriptive statistics are presented separately for Russell 1000 firms and Russell 2000 firms. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2 
Correlation Table 
 
_ ETR CETR ETR3 CETR3 
DD_ 
BTD 
MP_ 
BTD 
SHEL- 
TER 
MAR- 
GIN MBE 
INT-
OWN DED QIX TRAN 
MKT-
CAP MTB 
ETR 
 
0.41 0.73 0.43 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.04 
CETR 0.42 
 
0.38 0.73 0.40 0.44 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.05 -0.01 
ETR3 0.70 0.37 
 
0.46 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 -0.04 
CETR3 0.43 0.67 0.47 
 
0.34 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.10 -0.00 
DD_BTD 0.10 0.33 0.08 0.27 
 
0.81 0.29 0.45 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.15 -0.01 
MP_BTD 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.23 0.94 
 
0.36 0.57 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.11 -0.00 
SHELTER 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.64 0.72 
 
0.46 0.03 0.43 0.21 0.47 0.19 0.69 0.08 
MARGIN 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.66 0.69 0.54 
 
0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.23 0.17 
MBE -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 
 
0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.19 
INTOWN 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.40 0.10 0.05 
 
0.51 0.87 0.70 0.51 0.12 
DED 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.45 
 
0.27 0.20 0.22 0.03 
QIX 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.20 0.42 0.14 0.03 0.86 0.14 
 
0.45 0.51 0.05 
TRAN 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.11 -0.00 0.07 0.65 0.07 0.33 
 
0.31 0.22 
MKTCAP 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.27 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.12 -0.01 
 
0.24 
MTB -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.18 -0.20 -0.11 -0.12 0.13 0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.15 0.11 
 ROA -0.20 -0.06 -0.17 -0.11 0.74 0.82 0.68 0.60 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.01 
LEV 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 
PPE -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.24 0.16 0.10 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 
INTAN -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.07 
NOL 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.10 -0.16 -0.18 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.07 
CNOL 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.45 -0.48 -0.53 -0.37 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.15 
FORINC 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.37 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.10 
EQINC 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.10 -0.00 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 
R&D 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.51 -0.53 -0.34 -0.42 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.10 0.12 -0.01 0.30 
ADVERT -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 
SG&A -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.23 
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CAPX -0.15 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.11 
SALEGR 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.08 0.16 -0.03 0.19 
EXTXB -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.10 
FORINC 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.01 
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Table 2 
Correlation Table (Continued) 
 
_ ROA LEV PPE INTAN NOL 
C-
NOL 
FOR-
INC EQINC R&D 
ADV-
ERT SG&A CAPX 
SALE-
GR 
EXT-
XB 
FO-
DOM 
ETR -0.26 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.13 -0.07 -0.15 -0.21 -0.04 0.03 0.08 
CETR -0.13 0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.15 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.09 -0.17 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 
ETR3 -0.23 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.14 -0.07 -0.14 -0.22 -0.04 0.03 0.10 
CETR3 -0.18 0.17 0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.20 -0.09 0.06 -0.00 0.02 
DD_BTD 0.39 0.12 0.29 0.01 -0.10 -0.20 0.02 0.05 -0.20 -0.03 -0.10 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.03 
MP_BTD 0.46 0.10 0.18 -0.02 -0.12 -0.23 0.02 0.06 -0.21 -0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01 
SHELTER 0.41 0.04 0.09 0.19 -0.03 -0.23 0.53 0.19 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.47 
MARGIN 0.61 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.22 -0.22 0.12 0.11 -0.18 -0.04 -0.23 -0.03 0.19 0.13 0.07 
MBE 0.15 -0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.03 
INTOWN 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.27 0.06 -0.02 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.25 0.20 
DED 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.07 0.11 
QIX 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.25 0.02 -0.03 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.25 0.20 
TRAN 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.11 
MKTCAP 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.21 -0.02 -0.02 0.22 0.13 -0.02 0.01 -0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.20 
MTB 0.31 -0.13 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.27 0.09 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.13 0.11 
ROA   -0.11 0.20 0.07 -0.16 -0.22 0.27 0.10 -0.03 0.07 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.15 0.22 
LEV -0.08 
 
0.40 0.12 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.25 -0.06 -0.21 0.10 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 
PPE 0.12 0.38 
 
-0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 0.75 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
INTAN 0.04 0.24 -0.11 
 
0.13 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.19 -0.07 0.07 0.19 0.17 
NOL -0.20 0.03 -0.05 0.12 
 
0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.23 0.03 0.12 -0.03 -0.00 0.07 0.08 
CNOL -0.41 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.18 
 
-0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
FORINC 0.25 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.06 
 
0.10 0.23 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.63 
EQINC 0.13 0.04 0.06 -0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 
 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.09 
R&D -0.35 -0.15 -0.18 -0.03 0.21 0.31 0.07 -0.08 
 
0.07 0.39 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.22 
ADVERT 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.00 
 
0.36 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.03 
SG&A 0.08 -0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.14 -0.07 0.32 0.43 
 
0.24 0.08 0.07 0.16 
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CAPX 0.13 0.15 0.66 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.10 
 
0.18 -0.07 0.06 
SALEGR 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.00 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.21 
 
0.07 0.01 
EXTXB 0.16 -0.06 -0.06 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.05 
 
0.09 
FORINC 0.07 -0.01 -0.00 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.51 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 
  
The table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal for the sample. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3 
Institutional Holdings at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
Panel A: Differences in Means 
 
 
200 Bandwidth 
 
100 Bandwidth 
 
50 Bandwidth 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
INSTOWN 0.48 0.55 0.07*** 
 
0.42 0.56 0.14*** 
 
0.36 0.56 0.20*** 
         
Institutional Holdings by Types         
DED 0.08 0.08 0.00 
 
0.08 0.08 0.00 
 
0.08 0.08 0.00 
QIX 0.29 0.35 0.06*** 
 
0.25 0.35 0.10*** 
 
0.20 0.35 0.15*** 
TRAN 0.12 0.15 0.03*** 
 
0.11 0.15 0.05*** 
 
0.10 0.16 0.06*** 
 
         
Panel B: Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
 
 
INSTOWN 
Institutional Holdings by Types 
 DED QIX TRAN 
RU2000 0.259*** 0.000 0.199*** 0.077*** 
Z-stat (12.26) (0.00) (14.87) (9.54) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table examines institutional holdings for firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold one quarter after the June index reconstitution.  Institutional holdings 
are further decomposed into three types based on the Bushee (2001) classification: quasi-indexer (QIX), dedicated (DED) and transient (TRAN). Panel A shows 
mean differences in institutional holdings for firms around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff. Panel B shows estimates of the discontinuity in institutional holdings at 
the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff. The RD estimation follows Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) with non-parametric local linear regressions estimated on 
either side of the cutoff using a triangle kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the firm is in the Russell 2000 (1000). All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of Firms at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
Panel A: Differences in Means 
 
 200 Bandwidth 
 
100 Bandwidth 
 
50 Bandwidth 
 
 RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
MKTCAP  1.31 0.82   -0.49*** 
 
1.34 0.89 -0.45*** 
 
1.33 0.94 -0.39*** 
MTB  3.04 2.97 -0.07 
 
3.25 3.19 -0.06 
 
3.02 3.23 -0.21 
ROA  0.10 0.08 -0.01*** 
 
0.10 0.08 -0.02** 
 
0.09 0.09 -0.00 
LEV  0.28 0.27 -0.01 
 
0.30 0.27 -0.03 
 
0.34 0.30 -0.04 
PPE  0.41 0.36 -0.05 
 
0.39 0.36 -0.03 
 
0.42 0.37 -0.05 
INTAN  0.26 0.13 -0.13 
 
0.40 0.14 -0.26 
 
0.68 0.11 -0.57 
NOL  0.17 0.17 0.00 
 
0.17 0.17 0.00 
 
0.16 0.16 0.00 
CNOL  0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 
FORINC  0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00* 
EQINC  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
R&D  0.08 0.08 -0.00 
 
0.09 0.09 -0.00 
 
0.11 0.09 -0.02 
ADVERT  0.22 0.05 -0.18 
 
0.11 0.05 -0.06 
 
0.18 0.05 -0.12 
SG&A  0.98 0.31 -0.67 
 
0.47 0.33 -0.14* 
 
0.63 0.34 -0.29* 
CAPX  0.12 0.09 -0.03 
 
0.11 0.09 -0.02** 
 
0.13 0.10 -0.03 
SALEGR  0.45 0.78 0.33 
 
0.55 0.24 -0.31** 
 
0.83 0.26 -0.58** 
EXTXB  0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 
FODOM  0.10 0.10 0.00 
 
0.07 0.09 0.02 
 
-0.01 0.08 0.09 
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Panel B: Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
 
           
 MKTCAP MTB ROA LEV PPE INTAN NOL CNOL FORINC EQINC 
           
RU2000 -0.087 -0.135 -0.009 -0.067 -0.021 -0.510 0.008 -0.005 0.003 0.000 
Z-stat (-0.85) (-0.25) (-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.44) (-1.07) (0.47) (-0.50) (1.49) (0.96) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
        
 R&D ADVERT SG&A CAPX SALEGR FODOM EXTXB 
        
RU2000 -0.025 -0.129 -0.692 -0.035 -0.995* 0.058 -0.001 
Z-stat (-1.57) (-1.27) (-1.52) (-1.21) (-1.91) (0.75) (-1.47) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents the difference in characteristics of firms around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. Panel A shows mean differences. Panel B shows estimates 
of the discontinuity in each variable at the Russell 1000/2000 threshold. The RD estimation follows Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) with non-parametric 
local linear regressions estimated on either side of the cutoff using a triangle kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. z statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. In Panel B, RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the 
firm is in the Russell 2000 (1000). All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Table 5 
Tax Avoidance at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
 
Panel A: Differences in Means 
 
 
200 Bandwidth 
 
100 Bandwidth 
 
50 Bandwidth 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
 
RU1000 RU2000 Difference 
ETR -0.33 -0.31 0.02*** 
 
-0.34 -0.30 0.03*** 
 
-0.35 -0.30 0.04*** 
CETR -0.27 -0.26 0.02*** 
 
-0.29 -0.25 0.04*** 
 
-0.30 -0.24 0.06*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regression Discontinuity Analysis in Full Sample 
 
  (1) (2) 
  ETR CETR 
    
 RU2000 0.051*** 0.070*** 
 Z-stat (6.56) (5.56) 
 Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Regression Discontinuity Analysis in Switching Sample 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ETR CETR 
  
RU2000 0.064*** 0.098*** 
Z-stat (3.25) (3.78) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes 
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Panel D: Falsification Tests at Other Thresholds 
 
 RU500  RU1500  RU2000  RU2500 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
 ETR CETR  ETR CETR  ETR CETR  ETR CETR 
            
Right 0.012 0.008  0.000 -0.004  -0.004 -0.011  -0.005 -0.016 
Z-stat (1.38) (0.80)  (0.05) (-0.50)  (-0.58) (-0.97)  (-0.39) (-1.13) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
            
 
This table presents estimates of tax avoidance by firms at the Russell index threshold. Panel A shows mean differences in tax avoidance. Panel B shows estimates 
of the discontinuity in tax avoidance at the threshold. The RD estimation follows Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) with non-parametric local linear 
regressions estimated on either side of the cutoff using a triangle kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. Panel C presents discontinuity estimates 
from a sample of firms that switch to the Russell 2000 from the Russell 1000. The switching sample includes only switching firms, and compares tax avoidance 
in the year following the switch to tax avoidance in the year prior to the switch. Panel D shows falsification tests by testing for discontinuities in tax avoidance at 
pseudo-thresholds. Panel D compares firms on the right (“Right”) versus left of the Russell 500, 1500, 2000, and 2500. The dependent variables are two tax 
avoidance measures, ETR and CETR. z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. In Panels B and C, RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the firm is in the Russell 2000 (1000). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6 
Tax Shelter Use at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
 
  
 SHELTER 
 
RU2000 0.413*** 
Z-stat (3.06) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes 
 
This table examines discontinuities in tax shelter activities at the Russell index threshold using RD estimation. The 
dependent variable is SHELTER estimated using the formula in Wilson (2009). RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 
(0) if the firm is in the Russell 2000 (1000). The bias-corrected regression discontinuity (RD) estimation follows 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiuuik (2014) with non-parametric local linear regressions estimated on either side of the 
Russell index cutoff using a triangle kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. z statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7 
Net Income Margin at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
 
  
 MARGIN 
 
RU2000 0.105*** 
Z-stat (2.77) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes 
 
This table examines discontinuities in net income margin at the Russell index threshold using RD estimation. The 
dependent variable is the net income to sale ratio, MARGIN. RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the firm is 
in the Russell 2000 (1000). The bias-corrected regression discontinuity (RD) estimation follows Calonico, Cattaneo, 
and Titiuuik (2014) with non-parametric local linear regressions estimated on either side of the Russell index cutoff 
using a triangle kernel and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 8 
Meeting or Beating Earnings (MBE) Forecasts at the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold 
 
 
 
  
 MBE 
 
RU2000 0.079** 
Z-stat (2.49) 
Optimal Bandwidth Yes 
 
 
This table examines discontinuities in MBE at the Russell index threshold using RD estimation. MBE is an indicator 
that equals 1 if the firm meets or beats by up to two cents the median of the last forecast of annual earnings made by 
analysts, and equals 0 otherwise. RU2000 is an indicator that equals 1 (0) if the firm is in the Russell 2000 (1000). 
The bias-corrected regression discontinuity (RD) estimation follws Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiuuik (2014) with 
non-parametric local linear regressions estimated on either side of the Russell index cutoff using a triangle kernel 
and the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm. z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
 
